Cutting-edge network infrastructures such as ServiceOriented Architectures (SOAs) or, more generally, the Internet of Services (IoS) entail a major paradigm shift in the way ICT systems and applications are designed, implemented, deployed and consumed: they are no longer the result of programming components in the traditional meaning but are built by composing services that are distributed over the network and reconfigured and consumed dynamically in a demand-driven, flexible way. However, the new opportunities opened by the IoS will only materialize if concepts, techniques and tools are provided to ensure security. In fact, deploying services in such network infrastructures entails a wide range of trust and security issues, but solving them is extremely hard since making the service components trustworthy is not sufficient: composing services leads to new, subtle and dangerous, vulnerabilities due to interference between component services and policies, the shared communication layer, and application functionality. Thus, one needs validation of both the service components and their composition into secure service architectures.
In this extended abstract, we present the AVANTSSAR Validation Platform (or simply the AVANTSSAR Platform for short), an integrated toolset for the formal specification and automated validation of trust and security of SOAs and, in general, of applications in the IoS. To handle the complexity of trust and security in service orientation, the platform, shown in Figure 1 , integrates different technologies into a single tool, so they can interact and benefit from each other. In particular, the platform comprises three back-ends (CL-AtSe [7] , [28] , OFMC [13] , [19] , [27] , and SATMC [4] , [6] ), which provide a range of complementary automated reasoning techniques (including service orchestration, compositional reasoning, model checking, and abstraction-based validation). These three backends operate on the same input specification, written in the AVANTSSAR Specification Language ASLan.
To ease its usage and pave the way for its adoption by industry, the platform comprises a connectors layer that provides a set of software modules that carry out both
• the translation from application-level specification languages (e.g., our custom languages ASLan++ [11] , [29] , AnB, which is based on an extended Alice-and-Bob notation [24] , [26] , [27] , and HLPSL++, which is based on an extension of the High-Level Protocol Specification Language HLPSL [20] developed in the context of the AVISPA project [3] , [12] , [30] ) and industrially-suited specification languages (e.g., an annotated version of BPMN) into the low-level ASLan [10] , and • the reverse translation from the common output format of the validator back-ends into a higher-level MSC-like output format to ease the interpretation of the results for the user. Attack traces produced by the back-ends may be translated back to the higher level of ASLan++.
Moreover, the connectors layer is open to the integration of other connectors from other domains.
We have applied the platform to a large number of industrial case studies, collected into the AVANTSSAR Library of validated problem cases. In doing so, we have unveiled a number of problems and vulnerabilities in deployed services. These include, most notably, a serious flaw in the SAML-based Single Sign-On for Google Apps (now corrected by Google as a result of our findings) [6] . To the best of our knowledge, no other tool exhibits the same scope and expressiveness while achieving the same performance and scalability.
We have designed the AVANTSSAR Platform to be open to integration into industrial practice. As a concrete example, we have successfully migrated the platform to the SAP envi- 
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The AVANTSSAR Validation Platform Figure 1 . The AVANTSSAR Validation Platform ronment (as described in our deliverables and publications). The platform is a successor to the AVISPA Tool [3] , [12] , [30] , a push-button tool for the formal analysis of security protocols. The AVANTSSAR Platform significantly extends the AVISPA Tool's scope, effectiveness, and performance by scaling up to the trust and security of SOAs and the IoS. We thus expect that the AVANTSSAR Platform will inherit and considerably widen the user basis of the AVISPA Tool, which already comprises not only the members of the AVANTSSAR consortium but also several dozens of other academic and industrial practitioners, who have published a large number of works in which the AVISPA Tool is used. Our first, and positive, experience with the integration of the AVANTSSAR Platform within industrial practice indicates a strong potential for its wide take up.
We have implemented the AVANTSSAR Platform as a SOA itself, where each component service is offered as a web service. The platform also has a web-based graphical interface that allows the user to choose between three interaction modes of increasing level of sophistication and to execute, monitor and inspect the results of the platform in a user-friendly way. The web services and the associated documentation (a tutorial, guidelines, the Library and other examples, scientific papers and deliverables, and a users mailing list) are available at www.avantssar.eu, where one can also download the binaries and/or source code of the platform components.
A comprehensive description of the platform, and of the experiments that we carried out on industrial-scale case studies, is given in [2] . In the remainder of this abstract, we extract from [2] a summary of the main features of the platform.
A. The Specification Languages ASLan++ and ASLan
ASLan provides the user with an expressive language for specifying security protocols and their properties, based on set rewriting. At its core, ASLan describes a transition system, where states are sets of facts that model the state of honest agents, the knowledge of the intruder, communication channels, and facts used in formulating security goals. Transitions are specified as rewriting rules over sets of facts. A key feature of ASLan is the integration of this transition system, which expresses the dynamics of the protocol model, with (i) Horn clauses, which are used to describe security policies in a clear, logical way, and (ii) LTL formulae, which are used to express complex security goals (we use a variant of linear temporal logic with backwards operators and ASLan facts as propositions). ASLan is a low-level formal language and is thus easily usable only by experts, so we have developed the higher-level language ASLan++. In order to support formal specification of static and dynamic services and policy composition, ASLan++ introduces a number of features, in particular:
• Control flow constructs (e.g., if and while) enhance the readability and conciseness of the specifications, and make the specification job easier for modelers who are already familiar with programming languages.
• Modularity is supported by the use of hierarchical entities. Each entity is specified separately and can then be instantiated multiple times and composed with others. This allows the specifier, in particular, to localize policies in each entity by clarifying, for instance, who is responsible to grant or deny authorization as well as the various trust relationships between entities.
• There is an intuitive notation for channels, which may be used both as assumptions and as service goals and provides a simple but powerful way to specify communication and service compositionality.
We refer to [2] , [11] , [29] and the AVANTSSAR website for details on ASLan and ASLan++, including a tutorial with several modeling examples. Figure 1 shows the main components of the AVANTSSAR Platform, where the arrows represent the most general information flow, from input specification to validated output. In this flow, the platform takes as input specifications of the available services (including their security-relevant behavior and possibly the local policies they satisfy) together with a policy stating the functional and security requirements of the target service.
B. Description and Architecture of the Platform
The Orchestrator (short for Trust and Security Orchestrator) tries to build an orchestration, i.e., a composition, of the available services in a way that is expected (but not yet guaranteed) to satisfy the input policy. It takes as input an ASLan file with a specification of the available services and either a specification of the client or a partial specification of the goal (it may additionally receive as input a counterexample found by the Validator, if any), and outputs a specification of the target service that is guaranteed to satisfy the functional goals. More specifically, the Orchestrator produces as output an ASLan file with the specification of the available services, a full specification of the goal, and a specification of the client (a putative one, if it was not given as input).
The Validator (short for Trust and Security Validator) takes as input a system model, which may be the result of an orchestration, and a set of security goals formally specified in ASLan, and automatically checks whether the system model meets its security goals under the assumption that the network is controlled by a Dolev-Yao intruder. If this is the case, then the ASLan specification of the validated orchestration is given as output, otherwise a counterexample is returned to the Orchestrator (where a failed validation means the existence of vulnerabilities that need to be fixed) to provide a different orchestration, and ultimately to the user if no other orchestration is possible. Instead of using the Orchestrator, a user may manually generate the target service and simply invoke the Validator, providing as input the service and its security goals. In this case, the platform outputs either validation success or the counterexample found.
C. Orchestration and Validation
Orchestration and validation are carried out by the three back-ends of the platform (but, again, the platform is open to the integration of additional validation back-ends). The user can select which back-end to employ for the validation process. By default, all three are invoked in parallel on the same input specification, so that the user can compare the results of the validation carried out by the complementary automated reasoning techniques that the back-ends provide (including compositional reasoning, model checking, and abstract interpretation).
CL-AtSe [7] , [28] : The Constraint-Logic-based Attack Searcher for security protocols and services applies rewriting and constraint solving techniques to model all states that are reachable by the participants and decides if an attack exists with respect to the Dolev-Yao intruder. The main idea in CLAtSe consists in running the services in all possible ways by representing families of traces with positive or negative constraints on the intruder knowledge, variable values or sets, etc. Each service step execution adds new constraints on the current intruder and environment state. Constraints are kept reduced to a normal form for which satisfiability is easily checked. This allows one to decide whether some security property has been violated up to this point. CLAtSe requires a bound on the number of service calls in case the specification allows for loops in system execution. It implements several preprocessing modules to simplify and optimize input specifications before starting a verification. If a security property is violated then CL-AtSe outputs a trace that gives a detailed account of the attack scenario.
OFMC [13] , [19] , [27] : The Open-source Fixedpoint Model Checker (which extends the On-the-fly model checker, the previous OFMC) consists of two modules. The classical module performs verification for a bounded number of transitions of honest agents using a constraint-based representation of the intruder behavior. The fixedpoint module allows verification without restricting the number of steps by working on an over-approximation of the search space that is specified by a set of Horn clauses using abstract interpretation techniques and counterexample-based refinement of abstractions. Running both modules in parallel, OFMC stops as soon as the classic module has found an attack or the fixedpoint module has verified the specification, so as soon as there is a definitive result. Otherwise, OFMC can just report the bounded verification results and the potential attacks that the fixedpoint module has found. In case of a positive result, we can use the computed fixedpoint to automatically generate a proof certificate for the Isabelle interactive theorem prover. The idea behind the automatic proof generator OFMC/Isabelle [19] is to gain a high reliability, since after this step the correctness of the verification result no longer depends on the correctness of OFMC and the correct use of abstractions. Rather, it only relies on: (i) the correctness of the small Isabelle core that checks the proof generated by OFMC/Isabelle, and (ii) that the original ASLan specification (without over-approximations) indeed faithfully models the system and properties that are to be verified.
SATMC [4] , [6] : The SAT-based Model Checker is an open, flexible platform for SAT-based bounded model checking of security services. Under the standard assumption of strong typing, SATMC performs a bounded analysis of the problem by considering scenarios with a finite number of sessions. At the core of SATMC lies a procedure that, given a security problem, automatically generates a propositional formula whose satisfying assignments (if any) correspond to counterexamples on the security problem of length bounded by some integer k. Intuitively, the formula represents all the possible evolutions, up to depth k, of the transition system described by the security problem. Finding attacks (of length k) on the service therefore reduces to solving propositional satisfiability problems. For this task, SATMC relies on state-of-the-art SAT solvers, which can handle propositional satisfiability problems with hundreds of thousands of variables and clauses or more. SATMC can also be instructed to perform an iterative deepening on the number k of steps. As soon as a satisfiable formula is found, the corresponding model is translated back into a partial-order plan (i.e., a partially ordered set of rules whose applications lead the system from the initial state to a state witnessing the violation of the expected security property).
D. Concluding Remarks
The research innovation put forth by the AVANTSSAR Platform aims at ensuring global security of dynamically composed services and their integration into complex SOAs. Similar technologies are being developed (see e.g., [1] , [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] , [22] , [23] ) although we believe that none has yet the scale and depth of our platform. Brought together, these research efforts will result in a new generation of tools for automated security validation at design time, which is a stepping stone for the development of similar tools for validation at service provision and consumption time. For instance, part of the AVANTSSAR consortium is developing a security testing toolset in the context of the FP7 project "SPaCIoS: Secure Provision and Consumption in the Internet of Services" (www.spacios.eu). These advances will significantly improve the all-round security of SOAs and the IoS, and thus boost their trustworthy development and public acceptance.
